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INTRODUCTION 
The authors of the Federalist Papers (whom I will call “The Federalists,” collectively) 
sought a republican government that balanced stability and popular control. These two ideas are 
in constant tension, as the passions of the people fluctuate and their attention moves from issue to 
issue. The Federalists also wanted a government that would operate on reason and rationality 
rather than simple passions. America today is considerably more complicated and diverse than it 
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was in the era of the Federalists. We face more challenges than ever before in building a system 
that represents the people and achieves the Federalists’ vision of an enlightened, reasoned 
government. 
In this Article, I discuss the need for representative organizations to channel the 
“cacophonous voices” of the people. In order for the voice of the people to be heard in today’s 
government, it is necessary that low-income Americans band together to pool their collective 
strength. Poor Americans face the largest impediments to political participation, and they 
participate less frequently in politics than other groups. 
I use labor unions as an example of a collective group of citizens, and show that they 
have the ability to create this kind of large-scale organization and representation. Labor unions 
can be the voices of millions of Americans who otherwise have little say in government. By 
pooling their resources, American workers who are represented by unions are able to delegate to 
representatives who can go and be their voice—and a voice of reason. Rather than relying on 
emotional appeals to American workers, labor union leaders can become policy experts on the 
complicated issues that our government faces. This falls directly in line with the Federalist vision 
of government by reason. 
But these groups are under attack by “right-to-work” laws, which make it difficult for 
labor unions to organize. In right-to-work states, unionization is markedly lower, meaning that the 
working class has one fewer method of organizing to gain political representation. Comparing this 
with the relative ease with which business interests can organize, we must worry about whether 
we are achieving the Federalist goal of diverse representation in our government. 
Part I of this Article outlines and discusses the Federalists’ vision that our nation’s 
politics be organized, reasoned, and diverse. Part II discusses how labor unions promote this goal 
and how right-to-work laws undermine the Federalist vision. 
I. THE VISION OF THE FEDERALISTS REQUIRES ORGANIZED,  
REASONED DISCUSSION 
A. The Federalist Papers Advocate a Republican Government Influenced by the Popular Will 
The Federalists sought to design a government that would lay a foundation for a stable 
and lasting nation.1 They recognized that government is necessary to overcome the Hobbesian 
state of nature, which is to say that government can provide stability in a world that is constantly 
changing.2 The tumultuous years of the Articles of Confederation left the Federalists with a strong 
sense that a government needs to be both stable and effective.3 By establishing a lasting 
government, the Federalists were creating a framework that would allow individuals to think 
                                                                  
1  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  37, at 223 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Stability in 
government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence 
in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.”). 
2  See id.; cf. VINCENT OSTROM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC: DESIGNING THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 52 (2d ed. 1987) (describing the Hobbesian state of unorganized warfare as a war of “every man, 
against every man”). 
3  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 222-23; MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 224 (1987) (noting that Hamilton “emerges in The Federalist as a more ardent champion of 
governmental energy and efficiency than of the people’s natural rights”). 
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beyond their basic and immediate needs. Government would allow individuals to plan for the 
future and rely on the fruits of their labor.4 
Take, as a cognitive example, the idea that nobody washes a rental car.5 In the view of an 
economist, when an individual can get away with inaction (that is, when she can export the cost to 
another person), she will always do so. By the same logic, nobody builds a home in a lawless 
society when they lack the personal resources to defend it. Nobody invests the time and money to 
make anything of value when it can be easily stolen. In such a society, individuals could rationally 
choose to export the cost of production onto others by stealing what is valuable. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, individuals would produce very little in this type of society. This is part of the 
Hobbesian state of nature.6 
But in a society with laws and a powerful government to enforce them, individuals can 
be confident that their individual investments will be preserved. They can rest assured that there is 
a relatively low risk that their day’s work will be stolen—and, if it is stolen, that there will be 
some opportunity for compensation. Theft is but one source of the need for a strong government. 
The Federalists’ vision of a stable society goes beyond simple theft prevention. The 
Federalists were concerned with the threat of popular insurrections.7 Perhaps because they had 
just led a popular insurrection, or perhaps because they were wealthy property-owners, the 
Federalists feared an angry mob that could take property by force.8 The Federalists also feared 
that such a mob could take action in a republic without resorting to force; the Federalists 
recognized that the ballot box was just as powerful as the pitchfork.9 This mob mentality was the 
epitome of the evils of pure democratization—the prime danger of giving power to the popular 
will. 
This fear is most famously expressed in Federalist No. 10, in which James Madison 
explains the fundamental dangers of majority tyranny.10 Madison was concerned that confiscatory 
tax programs implemented by the mob would take from the rich and give to the poor in order to 
equalize the two groups.11 Today, this fear seems less relevant, considering the lack of such 
drastic action despite the vastly increased ability of the mob to participate in elections12 (but that 
                                                                  
4  See J. Michael Martinez & William D. Richardson, The Federalist Papers and Legal Interpretation, 45 
S.D. L. REV. 307, 327 (2000). 
5  Thomas L. Friedman, Out of Touch, Out of Time, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/opinion/11friedman.html. 
6  See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A.P. Martinich & Brian Battiste, eds., Broadview Press rev. 
ed. 2011) (1651). 
7  See, e.g., T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  9, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 108 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
8  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  9, supra note 7; THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 7; STEVEN H. JAFFE, 
WHO WERE THE FOUNDING FATHERS? TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF REINVENTING AMERICAN HISTORY 87 (1996). 
9  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (warning against 
the “common impulse of passion” found in factions); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  15, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“[T]he passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without 
constraint.”). 
10  See generally T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9. 
11  See id. at 74. 
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is a topic for another article). But the theoretical argument made by the Federalists is still 
relevant: a government of the people rightly fears that groups with greater political representation 
will trample upon the rights of political minorities. 
The Federalists sought to protect society from popular insurrections by delegitimizing 
rebellion.13 The Federalist view seeks to push individuals to seek change primarily through 
nonviolent means. The Federalists also recognized a fundamental truth about human nature: we 
are more dangerous in groups.14 Groups supply us with the comfort that others agree with us. 
Agreement is empowering, and it emboldens the members of the group. 
American government, by and large, seeks to individualize.15 We do not bring criminal 
prosecutions against groups.16 Hauling the individual to stand before the power of the State 
reminds that individual that he does not have the sole authority to decide what is best. The State, 
in its collective capacity, represents the people. In the case of a rebellion, the individual’s 
appearance in court, separate from his co-rebels, sears into his mind that he is individually 
responsible for his own actions. The individual will not be in any way protected by the safety of 
the group’s agreement. 
The process of individualization need not apply to one human being. A local government 
could blindly act in self-interest as easily as a mob.17 On various occasions, the Federalists 
propose that in a strong union, the states will be able to suppress the insurrection of one or two 
who choose to rebel.18 This reflects their expectation that even states would sometimes be caught 
up in the passions of the moment. 
                                                                  
12  Progressive taxation is one example of wealth transfer, but a major wealth transfer has not been effected 
in a way that substantially reduces income inequality, which is higher than it has been in a century. Connie Stewart, 
Income Gap between Rich and Poor Is Biggest in a Century, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-income-inequality-20130910,0,5392493.story. 
13  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  15, supra note 9, at 106 (“Regard to reputation has a less active influence 
when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one.”). 
14  See id. 
15  See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 105 (“[N]o person can be a fit judge of his or her own cause in relation to 
the interest of others. Each person stands exposed to the actions and judgments of others; and each from an individual 
vantage point participates in the government of society.”). 
16  There are several notable exceptions. Pinkerton liability for conspiracy is one area in which an individual 
can be punished for the crimes of the group. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). Another example is 
products liability, in which a manufacturer may be liable for its share of the market, regardless of actual wrongdoing. See, 
e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (1980). But these are exceptions to the general rule that every 
individual’s actions will be judged independently. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 
75, 82-83 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he most important [philosophical commitment of national criminal justice systems] is 
the focus on individual wrongdoing,” and explaining the move away from collective guilt); Joel Feinberg, Collective 
Responsibility, 65 J. PHILOSOPHY 674, 676 (1968) (describing vicarious criminal liability as “barbarous” if the actor acted 
independently). 
17  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  15, supra note 9, at 107 (“All this will be done; and in a spirit of 
interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state, which is 
essential to a right judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead 
the decision.”). 
18  OSTROM, supra note 2, at 117-18. 
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The government’s promotion of stability, however, was meant to do more than simply 
suppress rabble-rousers. Stability, as a goal, is meant to provide a framework for cooperation, not 
just authority. Cooperation will make the nation stronger, and it is required of a republican 
government in which the people are the last line of defense.19 Cooperation is especially necessary 
in a large nation, made up of states that frequently disagree. This idea is even more relevant in 
today’s diverse society, as I will discuss below. 
The people are in the best position to serve as a check on federal power. Although the 
Federalists designed the Constitution to be self-limiting through checks and balances, they 
recognized that the system could not be perfect.20 So, as a last resort, the Federalists wanted the 
people to be the final check. Their voice was an important failsafe to prevent tyranny by the 
government.21 If the government is truly falling into corruption or some other vice, at least there 
will be some person who can alert the people to take action. This is an example of “alarm-bell 
constitutionalism,” a theory that comes up at various times throughout the Federalist Papers.22 
But the Federalists were also realistic in recognizing that an individual could never be 
powerful enough to lead an insurrection against a tyrannical government. In fact, they recognized 
that the people generally preferred to fight amongst themselves rather than achieve a collective 
goal. The Federalists explicitly avoided rule by popular assemblies because they recognized that 
such assemblies have a hard time agreeing on anything.23 
Instead, the people must be led to an effective government.24 Popular participation in 
government (either at the front-end through the ballot box or as a final check on a tyrannical 
government) could only happen if the people are organized. In other words, the Federalists 
believed that the people could not rule themselves, and that they would not want to anyway. But 
that does not mean the people are impotent. On the contrary, they recognized that the people have 
the greatest power of all: they can riot and use mass force to achieve their desired ends.25 The use 
of force by the masses would pose the greatest threat to government of all, because it threatens 
government’s preference for stability. 
The Federalists needed to avoid such popular insurrections against legitimate 
                                                                  
19  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  31, at 193 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Everything 
beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it 
is to be hoped will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium . . . .”). 
20  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  85, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
21  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  31, supra note 19, at 193. 
22  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 7, at 69; T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  25, at 159 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  26, at 167-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 2003); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  
N O .  84, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
23  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  15, supra note 9, at 107 (“Those who have been conversant in the 
proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, when there is no exterior pressure of 
circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must 
be . . . .”); see RICHARD BEEMAN, P L A I N ,  H O N E S T  M E N :  T H E  M A K I N G  O F  T H E  A M E R I C A N  
C O N S T I T U T I O N  2 8 - 2 9  (2009) (discussing Madison’s distrust of government which serves solely popular interests). 
24  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  28 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the people will resort to rebellion 
and force if government is not strong enough to suppress rebellion). 
25  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
NEIDHARDT - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/15  11:42 AM 
256 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.3 
government.26 They were acutely aware of the citizenry’s power to rise up and overthrow a 
government. In fact, they stated that one of the “principal purposes to be answered by union” was 
to preserve the public peace.27 They did not want America to look like Holland, which suffered 
from “popular convulsions.”28 The Federalists believed that preventing class division was an 
impractical goal; they saw that there would always be elites in society.29 Instead, they adopted an 
anti-utopian worldview: they realized that government cannot prevent conflict among groups, but 
it can provide a means for settling those conflicts amicably.30 
Society needs laws, which allow individuals to settle their differences, and it needs a 
powerful government to enforce those settlements. Such is the basic Hobbesian purpose of 
government: it removes the need for citizens to resort to destabilizing self-help remedies (such as 
rebellion). The Federalists were concerned with preventing the need for rebellion at all. The 
government must be strong enough to show a great deal of force. Only this show of force would 
truly eliminate the risk of rebellion.31 This is in tension with the more pervasive notion in the 
Federalist Papers that the popular will should be what governs the nation. 
B. The Federalists Recognized That Various Groups Should Be Represented 
Despite the Federalists’ insistence that the “popular will” be a driving force in the 
republic, they also sought to avoid the dominance of self-interested passion.32 These two concepts 
are in tension. How do you listen to the voice of the people when they are rational, yet ignore 
them when they are not? The Federalists accepted this problem by recognizing that those who 
control government will consistently seek to defend their own interests.33 Politics is, at its most 
basic level, an assertion of passion and interest,34 which can arise easily from self-interest to cloud 
one’s judgment.35 From such a selfish perspective, politicians sometimes find evidence with rose-
                                                                  
26  See id. 
27  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  23, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
28  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  20, at 133 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003). 
29  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 73 (“From the protection of different and unequal 
faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the 
influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different 
interests and parties.”); Murray Dry, The Debate Over Ratification of the Constitution, in A COMPANION TO THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 482, 487 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole, eds., 2000) (“Hamilton said inequality was inevitable if 
individual liberty was secured (Madison says the same in The Federalist, no. 10) . . . .”). 
30  See, e.g., T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  7 (Alexander Hamilton) (listing potential conflicts and ways the 
government can provide a forum for their resolution). 
31  THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  28, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
32  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  1, at 27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Happy will it be 
if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations 
not connected with the public good.”). 
33  Id. (“But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.”). 
34  The Federalists use “passion” to refer to uncontrollable emotions, and “interest” to refer to cool, 
deliberate self-interest. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 106-109. 
35  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  63, at 382 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (noting that 
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colored glasses in support of a self-serving policy without seriously examining its wide-reaching 
effects. Yet at the same time, the Federalists believed that there must be a better way to run a 
country. 
The Federalists wanted to devise a procedure that would prevent the use of passion and 
illegitimate arguments made with the purpose of advancing individual interest.36 To use political 
theorist James Harrington’s example, they wanted one child to cut the cake and the other child to 
decide which slice she gets.37 The Founders sought a government that reflexively represented 
opposing sides.38 This is emblematic of the Federalists’ theme: that it is possible to design the 
structure of government so that it systematically, automatically achieves better governance. 
The Federalists believed strongly that our nation was a particular sort of experiment39: 
they saw America as a common project.40 Each constituent part of the country has something to 
add to its goals. Of course, this falls directly in line with a political ideology that focuses on broad 
cooperation. The Federalists believed that if we all work together, we can accomplish more than 
we ever could on our own.41 Working together allows people to pool resources and divide labor, 
resulting in increased efficiency. Cooperation in a republic requires the participation of divergent 
interests in the governing process.42 This cooperation can be accomplished by the representation 
of various groups in government.43 
                                                                  
“irregular passion or illicit advantage” can lead to adoption of unwise policies). 
36  S e e  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  1, supra note 32, at 29 (“[A] dangerous ambition more often lurks 
behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness 
and efficiency of government.”). This point appears repeatedly, including in a defense of the Senate’s design:  
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in 
all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments 
in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or 
misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they 
themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.  
T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  63, supra note 35. 
37  See JAMES HARRINGTON, T H E  O C E A N A  A N D  O T H E R  W O R K S  O F  J A M E S  H A R R I N G T O N  44 
(London, 1771), available at http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/916/0050_Bk.pdf. 
38  This is evident in the concept of separation of powers. See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 142-43, 165. 
39  Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
potential for a state to serve as a “laboratory”). 
40  See, e.g., T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  11, at 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(referring to the construction of a navy, “different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage 
for this essential establishment”). 
41  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  12, at 90 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
42  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  5, at 45 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  15, 
supra note 9, at 106-107; T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  36, at 213 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(describing the “natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community”); T H E  
F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Different interests necessarily exist in 
different classes of citizens.”). 
43  See C.H. HOEBEKE, T H E  R O A D  T O  M A S S  D E M O C R A C Y :  O R I G I N A L  I N T E N T  A N D  T H E  
S E V E N T E E N T H  A M E N D M E N T , 28 (1995) (“It defied ‘Reason’ and ‘the Laws of Nature’ that one citizen or group of 
citizens should have a greater voice politically than any of the others.”). 
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This can also be seen in a more cynical way: any government needs a certain degree of 
support from its people. For example, if a general does not have the support of her army, it will 
desert her. A government needs to please its constituents or the underrepresented portions rebel.44 
To avoid this problem, the Federalists sought to include members of different societal classes in 
government.45 Thus, they crafted the House of Representatives in a way that they believed would 
represent the different “classes” or “trades” of society (indirectly).46 
The Federalists also wanted the door to the legislature to be open to anyone.47 Of course 
they limited this proposition to one house of the legislature,48 but the principle remains: every part 
of society has something to contribute to this common project, and it should be represented in our 
national government. This egalitarian principle is tempered by the opposing conceptual theme that 
we must prevent government from being a raw reflection of the shifting emotions of the people.49 
In addition to the government’s structure, the Federalists realized that politicians have a 
personal incentive to learn the interests of their constituents.50 Politicians’ jobs will depend on 
their ability to effectively represent their constituents’ interests.51 So it naturally follows that 
politicians will work their hardest to learn more about their constituents, on whom they depend 
for subsistence.52 Politicians will want to serve as a conduit for the local information, which is 
most beneficial to their constituents. 
But the Federalists were not content to stop there. They put a safeguard in place for the 
representation of society’s interests: federalism. The advantage of having two governments is 
simple: if one government does not fully represent your views, you can change your allegiance to 
the other government.53 This structure allows the people to organize when it becomes necessary to 
                                                                  
44  See id. at 28-30 (explaining the tension between representing all groups and attaining social harmony 
without conflict). Hoebeke describes the “central dilemma” of the Federalist Papers as “secur[ing] the public good and 
private rights against the dangers of such a faction, and at the same time. . . preserv[ing] the spirit and the form of popular 
government.” Id. at 30 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 75). 
45  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  35, at 210-211 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
46  The Federalists did not believe that each class could literally be represented in the House of 
Representatives. Rather, they believed that those who were elected would serve as proxies for the interests of each class. 
See id. For example, artisans and manufacturers would be willing to vote for a merchant, who would represent the needs of 
the commercial class. Id. (noting that while actual representation by every class is “visionary,” certain classes would 
sufficiently represent the interests of others); OSTROM, supra note 2, at 99-100. 
47  THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  36, supra note 42, at 213 (“The door ought to be equally open to all . . . .”); 
OSTROM, supra note 2, at 100. 
48  U . S .  C O N S T .  art. 1, § 3 (election of Senators by state legislatures), amended by U . S .  C O N S T .  
amend. XVII. 
49  See supra Part I.A. 
50  THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  35, supra note 45, at 212 (“Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for 
the favor of the people . . . should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations and should be willing 
to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct?”). 
51  Id. 
52  THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 45, at 212 (noting that representatives will want to learn about the 
“dispositions and inclinations” of the people they represent); OSTROM, supra note 2, at 99. 
53  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  28, supra note 31, at 175. This change in allegiance can be seen even 
today. Following the election of Barack Obama, the media excitedly reported that various online petitions and resolutions 
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protect against an encroachment by the national government.54 This idea reflects an understanding 
by the Federalists that organization of society is necessary to keep the government in line. They 
put into action their belief that the people need leadership in order to keep the government in 
check. It is through this organization that people will be able to change their government. If the 
people have an organized way of expressing their opinions, they will be less likely to resort to the 
use of force. 
C. The Founders Desired the Use of Reason in Political Debates, Which  
Requires an Organized Society 
The Federalists wanted reason to be the driving force in American government;55 that is 
why they designed a republic instead of a democracy.56 A republic differs from democracy in a 
fundamental way: the people do not directly govern themselves.57 Rather, they are governed by 
representative leaders.58 Those leaders then use the power of group discussion to arrive at the best 
policy for the nation.59 This discussion relies on reason, rather than self-interested passion, to 
achieve the best result.60 This view is probably a direct outgrowth of the Enlightenment era views 
of the Federalists’ time.61 
This theory is at once elitist and egalitarian, depending on one’s degree of cynicism. It is 
elitist if one believes that only those voices belonging to the rich and powerful will be part of that 
discussion. But it is egalitarian if one believes that all voices will be heard. Put another way, the 
optimist believes that “[w]hen the cacophonous voice of the People is properly filtered through 
                                                                  
had been filed to allow certain states to secede from the Union. See, e.g., Patrik Jonsson, States Rebel Against Washington, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2009/0327/p02s01-usgn.html; Sarah 
Titterton, Texas Could Bid for Independence, Says Governor as Fury over Obama’s Spending Rises, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 
16, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1170447/Texas-bid-independence-says-Governor-fury-Obamas-
spending-rises.html. This continued for a number of years. See, e.g., Manny Ferandez, White House Rejects Petitions to 
Secede, but Texans Fight On, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/us/politics/texas-
secession-movement-unbowed-by-white-house-rejection.html; Apparently, the signers of those petitions believed that their 
state government would more effectively represent their views than the federal government. 
54  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  28, supra note 31, at 177 (“They can readily communicate with each other in 
the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.”). 
55  WHITE, supra note 3, at 58, 103-105; OSTROM, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that “constraint is requisite for 
the application of reason and justice in the conduct of human affairs”). 
56  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  39, at 238 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
57  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  48, at 306 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (describing the 
difference between a democracy and republic). 
58  OSTROM, supra note 2, at 97-101; see id. at 98 (“Through the institutional device of elected 
representation, the government of a republic can extend to a larger number of people and to a larger region than a direct 
democracy can.”). 
59  See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 160. 
60  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,2003) (“But the mild 
voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies 
as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain.”). See also OSTROM, 
supra note 2, at 163-64 (describing how rival interests can work together for compromise). 
61  See WHITE, supra note 3, at 3, 103-04. 
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the moderating influences of the republic, the voice is tempered, channeled, and made 
coherent.”62 The Federalists sought to strike a balance between a too-small constituency (which 
would be partial to local interests) and a too-large one (in which the representatives cannot be 
“acquainted with all their local circumstances”).63 
We often forget this defining aspect of republican government today because we think of 
America as a democracy—that is, a nation in which the people decide policy questions for 
themselves. But this view obscures the important fact that governing by reason cannot be done by 
the people as a whole. The whole group of “the people” cannot at once engage in a reasoned 
discussion, which accounts for the varied interests represented in America.64 Even if it were 
possible for them to do so, the Federalists clearly did not support this as an option—they wanted 
the cream of the crop to head to Washington to talk things out and decide what was best for the 
nation.65 And they took measures to ensure that the elite would not abuse that structure, by 
implementing a system of separation of powers.66 
The Federalist structure for government requires reason, but reason requires leadership.67 
A republic can only be reasonable if it is made up of reasonable representatives—those who could 
engage in the Federalist ideal of government by discussion. Clearly influenced by Enlightenment 
thought, the Federalists took an empirical approach to government, looking at what has succeeded 
in the past and designing a system that would be effective in avoiding past failures.68 
One of the salient aspects of the Federalist vision of reason is the importance of 
collective use of reason.69 It is easy to see why the Federalists, who had just thrown off the yoke 
of tyrannical monarchy, believed it was problematic for one person to make decisions. When one 
person has control over an entire government, she will sometimes make poor decisions.70 It is 
easy to make errors when one person receives no input from others.71 Once the error is made, that 
person’s pride makes it very difficult for her to admit that she was wrong, so the error will likely 
                                                                  
62  David L. Gregory, Lessons from Publius for Contemporary Labor Law, 38 A L A .  L .  R E V .  1, 11 
(1986). 
63  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 77; OSTROM, supra note 2, at 98. 
64  See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 139. 
65  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  48, supra note 57. 
66  See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 164. 
67  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 76 (noting the need to delegate government to a small 
group of citizens who can best promote the public good). 
68  See, e.g., T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  17, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(describing the structure of “ancient feudal systems”); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  18, at 120 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 2003) (describing the Amphictyonic and Achaean Leagues of Greece); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  19 (James 
Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (German confederacy); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  20, supra note 28 (Netherlands 
confederacy); T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  34, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (Roman 
legislatures).  
69  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 73 (noting that the “first object of government” is to 
protect the “diversity in the faculties of men.”). 
70  Id. (“The reason of man continues fallible.”). 
71  See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 43 (describing the assumption of the Federalists that human beings are 
fallible). 
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go uncorrected.72 
In a group, however, her rivals will be quick to point out when she has made a faulty 
decision.73 This is the beautiful thing about republican politics: even though there are strong 
incentives to be nasty and harsh toward your rivals, that same incentive protects the rights of the 
people. Rivals constantly will be on the lookout for errors, which they can use to their 
advantage.74 Put simply: our rivals are better at detecting our flaws than we are.75 
A republican government solves another aspect of this problem: it makes it possible for 
others to apologize for or recant our mistakes.76 For example, if a legislator sponsors a policy that 
turns out to be disastrous for the country, that individual legislator need not stand up and repeal it. 
Others (allies or rivals alike) can do so easily, sparing the original legislator a great degree of 
pain. 
So it was obvious to the Federalists that government by discussion was essential to 
government. They wanted government to engage in calm and cool deliberation for the nation,77 
not to be an angry mob of self-interested individuals. When this is combined with their view that 
government would include the interests of so many parts of American society, the system comes 
together as a complete picture. Under this idealistic (if unrealistic) system, if every interest is 
represented, and each engages in a totally rational discussion, we are bound to end up with the 
best policies. 
This theory is deeply dependent on knowledge, which is consonant with the Federalist 
view that the national government would serve as a machine for transferring information to those 
who make decisions.78 If the federal legislature is conceived of as a way of making use of reason, 
it also depends on the transmission of knowledge. Full transmission of knowledge depends on an 
organization of society in which the varied interests of the people can be coherently organized for 
use by government representatives. Only within an organized society can all three Federalist 
goals—the popular will, reason, and representation of all interests—be accomplished. 
                                                                  
72  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 73 (“As long as the connection subsists between his 
reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will 
be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.”). 
73  This Federalist viewpoint may not be universally accepted today. See Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and 
Social Pressure, SCI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31. 
74  See generally T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9 (describing the value of pitting one man’s 
ambition against another’s). For a modern example, see President Obama’s Truth Team, which sought to point out the 
flaws in the 2012 Presidential candidacy of Governor Mitt Romney. See David Nakamura, Obama’s ‘Truth Team’ Aims to 
Network Its Way to a Reelection Win, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-
truth-team-aims-to-network-its-way-to-a-reelection-win/2012/02/10/gIQAGs5u9Q_story.html. 
75  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 H A R V .  L .  
R E V .  2311 (2006) (finding that the three branches of government are less competitive when they are controlled by the 
same party). 
76  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (explaining how 
individual pride can easily get in the way of effective governance, especially in the domain of international relations). 
77  See WHITE, supra note 3, at 109 (noting that “‘interest’ designates a calm, deliberate, and general passion 
or desire for one’s own happiness”; this is contrasted with “passion”). 
78  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  36, supra note 42, at 214 (providing example that local tax information could be 
sent to the national government by way of elected representatives). 
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II. A STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THE THREE FEDERALIST GOALS 
A. Large Representative Groups Are Necessary Today to Represent the  
Interests of the American People 
At the time of the Federalist Papers, the American population was somewhere between 
three and four million people.79 Today, there are well over three hundred million Americans80—
almost a hundredfold increase. At the same time, the size of the House of Representatives has 
increased from its original size of sixty-five (one representative for every 33,000 people) to only 
four hundred thirty-five, a sevenfold increase (one representative for every 700,000 people, with 
some districts as large as 958,000).81 The size of the Senate has gone from twenty-six original 
members to one hundred,82 which is only a fourfold increase. The number of decision-makers in 
today’s government is disproportionately small in comparison to the population than at the time of 
the Federalists.83 
It follows logically that individual legislators have a more difficult time ascertaining the 
needs of his or her individual constituents. It is simply not possible for a legislator with seven 
hundred thousand constituents to know their varied needs on her own. Rather, members of 
Congress depend on their staff to do a substantial amount of fact-finding. In fact, congressional 
staff has increased dramatically in the last hundred years. In 1955, Congress (excluding legislative 
agencies) employed 5,706 staff members.84 By 2005, this number had increased dramatically to 
17,376.85 This increase occurred during a time when the size of the legislature itself did not 
change at all.86 
This increase has been met with a related increase in the presence of representative 
                                                                  
79  T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  55, at 340 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Estimating the 
Negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by that 
time, if it does not already, amount to three millions.”); JOHN PECK, FACTS AND CALCULATIONS RESPECTING THE 
POPULATION AND TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1-2 (Boston, 1799) (predicting that, at the end of 
1790, there would be four million Americans). 
80  P A U L  M A C K U N  &  S T E V E N  W I L S O N ,  U . S .  C E N S U S  B U R E A U ,  P O P U L A T I O N  
D I S T R I B U T I O N  A N D  C H A N G E :  2 0 0 0  T O  2 0 1 0 ,  a t  1  ( 2 0 1 1 ) ,  available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf. 
81  Peter Baker, Expand the House?, N . Y .  T I M E S  (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/us/politics/18baker.html; see OSTROM, supra note 2 at 101 (“If the United States had 
been organized as a simple unitary republic, one can reasonably infer that the republic long ago would have fallen victim 
to the constraint inherent in the size principle.”). 
82  The original thirteen states have increased to fifty. Each state has two Senators. 
83  It should be noted that this was part of the plan of the Federalists. They did not want the size of Congress 
to increase proportionally with the size of the population, because they feared that it would one day become too large to 
accomplish anything. T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  55, supra note 79, at 338-39; OSTROM, supra note 2, at 92-97. 
84  R .  E R I C  P E T E R S E N ,  C O N G .  R E S E A R C H  S E R V . , R40056, L E G I S L A T I V E  B R A N C H  
S T A F F I N G ,  1 9 5 4 - 2 0 0 7 ,  at 3 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40056_20081015.pdf. 
85  Id. at 4 tbl.1. 
86  It should be noted here that the Federalists did not want a large legislature, fearing that it would turn into 
a “mob.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 79, at 340; see John Burt, Tyranny and Faction in the Federalist Papers, 
RARITAN Fall 1993, at 56, 79. 
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groups in Washington. American citizens rely on others to communicate their sides of the story to 
the government more efficiently. They rely on large, representative groups of individuals and 
organizations whose purpose is to effectuate that communication.87 
Whereas it was once common for individuals to walk into the White House for a meeting 
with the President,88 only the most elite members of American society would dream of doing that 
today.89 It simply is not possible (nor would it be efficient) for government to work that way 
anymore. In this fundamental way, the structure of government has changed, and today 
government relies a great deal on representative leaders who have actual contact with government 
officials. Of course, we must ask: who are these elite? Which individuals are having contact with 
our government? Are there ways for the average American to be sure that her voice is being heard 
in that room? While it is not possible to answer all of these questions in this Article, I will explain 
why the Federalists would find them to be important. 
Recall that the Federalists specifically mentioned that legislators would have an incentive 
to learn what their constituents want—and that they would be most effective in their 
representation if they depend on the people for their livelihood, because they would be forced to 
learn their constituents’ views.90 If a legislator ignores his constituents, he will not keep his job 
for long. This proposition makes perfect sense in light of the eighteenth-century viewpoint of the 
Federalists. It was (relatively) easy to keep track of a small constituency. A member of the House 
of Representatives needed only to know the viewpoints of some relatively small, homogenous 
group of citizens (less than 33,000), who were all white, male, property owners. Today, members 
of Congress need not learn the varied interests of every different group in their district—they need 
to learn from those who are most likely to participate and affect their election.91 As I discuss 
below, this means that certain classes of citizens (the wealthy, for example) are considerably more 
likely to have their views represented than those with little influence. Those who have access to 
government are represented. 
Following a drastic increase in size, it is natural to observe a shift in government toward 
legislator interaction with the leaders of organizations, rather than individual constituents. Just as 
it is more efficient for a town to designate one person to bake all of the town’s bread (because 
they acknowledge that it is far easier for one person to bake one hundred loaves of bread than for 
one hundred people to each bake one), Americans find that it is sensible to delegate a large 
                                                                  
87  FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN 
POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, 89 (1998) (“Most Americans are members of interest groups and many more have 
their interests represented by groups of which they are not formal members . . . .”). 
88  Allen Thorndike Rice, Introductory to REMINISCENCES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN BY DISTINGUISHED MEN 
OF HIS TIME (Allen Thorndike Rice, ed., Harper & Bros. 1909) (1886) (“Most men who visited Washington during the 
civil war met with Abraham Lincoln. Amid the clash of armed strife and the din of party struggle, he never denied to the 
humblest citizen a willing ear and a cheering word.”); Katie Zezima, People Used to Be Able to Walk into the White 
House. Legally., WASH. POST. (Sept. 23, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2014/09/23/people-used-to-be-able-to-walk-into-the-white-house-legally/. 
89  However, it was possible to win a dinner with President Barack Obama during his campaigns if one 
donated to his campaign. “I’m Asking One Last Time,” BARACKOBAMA.COM (Sept. 25, 2012) 
https://www.barackobama.com/news/im-asking-one-last-time/.  
90  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  46, at 297 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
91  See infra Part II.B.5. 
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portion of their political influence to groups who can more efficiently represent them.92 This has 
been the way American government has worked for a very long time.93 American politics have 
been largely about civic organizations for the past century.94 Even today, presidential candidates 
often begin their journey with stops at organizations like the Veterans of Foreign Wars or the Elks 
Lodge in small towns in New Hampshire.95 
But group representation does not require that candidates come to the groups. Often, 
groups select a delegate who is able to go to the government. This allows one of the group’s 
members to become an expert in the policy area most important to that group. If one considers the 
fact that most legislation is too complicated or arcane for the average voter to fully understand,96 
it makes sense that such legislation is passed into law with input mostly from experts. Individual 
citizens hear bits and pieces about major bills through the news media, but the citizenry certainly 
cannot be relied upon to dig into the details of complex legislation. The Federalists did not believe 
that citizens should be forced to make time to deal with the details of governing—they were 
expected to allow their representatives to do that work for them.97 We, too, should expect that our 
interests will only be represented in government indirectly. 
The decreased proportion with which each American is represented in the federal 
government has left a gap in representational efficacy. In other words, we now depend on interest 
groups to do some of the fact-finding representation that the Federalists assumed could be done 
by members of Congress.98 It only makes sense that as each congressperson’s share of 
constituents rose from thirty-three thousand to seven hundred thousand, Americans would find the 
need to seek representation through other means. They would seek to have their voice heard by 
channeling it through representative groups. 
What are representative groups? Definitions among political scientists vary, but for the 
purpose of this Article I assume that a “representative group” is an organization which represents 
the social, political, or economic interests of a specified group of people. Some representative 
groups form around issues, others around religion, and still more around employment status or 
myriad other characteristics. For the purpose of analyzing the Federalist vision, I do not 
distinguish sharply among these differences. 
                                                                  
92  So large a portion, in fact, that groups spent some $2.6 billion on lobbying in 2006. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, 
What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 Y A L E  L .  &  P O L ’ Y  R E V .  485, 519 (2008). 
93  See, e.g., E .  P E N D L E T O N  H E R R I N G ,  G R O U P  R E P R E S E N T A T I O N  B E F O R E  C O N G R E S S , 13 
(1929) (describing the importance of group leaders in the political process of Washington). 
94  See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN 
CIVIC LIFE 23-30 (2003); Robert D. Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in 
America, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 664, 665 (1995) (explaining the relationship between political engagement and social 
organizations). 
95  See New Hampshire Visits, P 2 0 1 2  R A C E  F O R  T H E  W H I T E  H O U S E , 
http://www.p2012.org/chrnnewh/newhvisits12.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); New Hampshire Visits by Republican 
Prospects in 2015, P2016 RACE FOR THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.p2016.org/chrnnewh/nhvisits15r.html (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2015). 
96  See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the 
Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 I O W A  L .  R E V .  1287, 1334 (2004). 
97  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 76. 
98  See H E R R I N G , supra note 93, at 240 (describing extra-legal interest groups as “an integral part of our 
representative system of government”). 
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This collective need for political representation is essential to fulfill the Federalists’ main 
goals of government: influence by the popular will, representation of all interests, and the use of 
reason. Large representative groups can accomplish all three. On the other hand, 
disproportionately powerful interest groups can destroy those goals.99 
Take, for example, a political organization such as NARAL Pro-Choice America.100 
Americans who support abortion rights need not take the time to write to their member of 
Congress on every piece of abortion legislation that comes to the floor of the House. In fact, it 
would be exceedingly difficult to do so based on the legislative process that allows riders to be 
added to so many bills—abortion legislation could sneak into just about any bill. Instead, those 
citizens can join and fund NARAL, an organization which promises to research that legislation 
and provide representation on behalf of its citizen members.101 The organization then becomes 
responsive to the needs of its citizen-benefactors, who provide funding and political support.102 
NARAL, in return, becomes an expert on pro-choice arguments and abortion legislation and 
provides the most effective representation possible.103 It is almost as if American citizens have 
outsourced their government participation to an organization. 
By “hiring” NARAL to provide them with this representation, the people are ensuring 
that their version of the popular will is being heard by the federal government. Those who agree 
with the organization are ensuring that their interest is represented. Of course, America is a 
diverse nation with citizens whose interests vary widely. Thus, representation of the popular will 
requires a great degree of work. Because many interest groups are focused on specific issues,104 
groups exist to represent both sides of the debate.105 This situation has a long tradition in America. 
Opposing interest groups have coexisted since at least 1929, when Pendleton Herring wrote: 
Not only are almost all sorts of interests and classes represented but also all 
sides of most questions as well. For example, the motorists have the American 
Automobile Association; the manufacturers are represented by the National 
Automobile Chamber of Commerce, while the distributors speak through the 
National Automobile Dealers Association. Makers and sellers of accessories, 
tires, batteries, and parts have their national associations. What of the poor 
                                                                  
99  B A U M G A R T N E R  &  L E E C H , supra note 87, at 85. 
100  NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., http://www.naral.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
101  See About Us, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 
30, 2015). 
102  See Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group 
Activity in a Decade of Change, 45 J .  P O L .  351, 354 (1983) (discussing the effect of developments in mass-
communication on the “increased salience of indirect lobbying techniques in which groups mobilize citizens at the 
grassroots to communicate with policymakers”). 
103  See id. at 365 (quoting a chemical company’s senior lobbyist as stating “we’re doing a lot more 
providing of research results and technical information”). 
104  Such as NARAL, the National Rifle Association, the Human Rights Campaign, etc. But see Mayer, 
supra note 92, at 532. 
105  Some of the authors who held this view are collected in B A U M G A R T N E R  & L E E C H , supra note 87, 
at 87 (referencing generally works of de Tocqueville; HERRING, supra note 93; DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951); LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 
(1963); and V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (5th ed. 1964)). 
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pedestrian? There is the American Pedestrian Protective Association, organized 
in 1926, with national headquarters in Washington. There is the Lord’s Day 
Alliance on the one hand and the Association Opposed to Blue Laws on the 
other . . . . Instances could be multiplied indefinitely . . . .106 
But the reality is not so simple. Scholars have abandoned the view that all interests are 
equally represented, because interest groups face organizational hurdles in getting off the 
ground.107 
The proliferation of interest groups promotes the Federalists’ principle that all interests 
should be represented in government.108 The Federalists wanted opposing sides to come together 
and, using reasoned discussion, come to a conclusion that takes those interests into account.109 
Though sometimes these groups may not recognize that they are self-interested,110 “the primary 
purpose of these organizations is to guard the interests of their respective groups.”111 This mirrors 
the adversary legal system, which pits two sides against each other, with the hope that the most 
beneficial outcome will result. However, if one side of an issue has a disproportionate share of 
power, public policy will be skewed against the public interest.112 
We must keep in mind the need for balance in such an adversary system. Just as the legal 
system debates how procedural rules will benefit or prejudice one side in the courtroom, the 
advantages given to certain groups will change how much our national political debate looks like 
the Federalist vision of multi-interest representation. 
These interest groups also contribute to the Federalists’ goal of promoting the use of 
reason in political debate. An expert organization, which acts as a repeat player on the 
government stage, will be held to a high standard by the government. Members of Congress, who 
must make policy decisions, are more likely to pay attention to an organization that uses 
persuasive argumentation, rather than appealing to passion or false claims. Organizations that use 
unsavory tactics or skewed data quickly lose credibility.113 
Of course, those groups might be influenced by factors we would consider undesirable 
for use in republican decision-making, such as campaign donations. And we must keep in mind 
that lobbyists present age-old opportunities for corruption and other unsavory activities. By and 
large, however, the interest groups that survive are those that promote the views of their members 
without breaking laws. Most importantly, they do so through the use of reason114—thus promoting 
the Federalist goal of government by discussion. 
                                                                  
106  H E R R I N G , supra note 93, at 22 (footnote omitted). 
107  B A U M G A R T N E R  &  L E E C H , supra note 87, at 87. 
108  See Mayer, supra note 92, at 539. 
109  See supra Part I.C. 
110  HERRING, supra note 93, at 23 (“[I]t is difficult to find a forthright acknowledgement on the part of the 
group representatives that they are entirely self-interested.”). 
111  Id. 
112  Mayer, supra note 92, at 540. 
113  See Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 102, at 365 (describing survey results which indicate “it was no 
longer sufficient just to know the right people[, n]ow they must also marshall complicated and well-reasoned arguments”). 
114  See id. 
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However, this theory is subject to a flaw, which was unforeseeable by the Federalists. As 
social scientist Mancur Olson argued, special interest groups that promote laws that benefit 
certain individuals or businesses mobilize at a faster rate than public interest groups, which work 
for laws that benefit society generally.115 These public interest groups seem to debunk the idea 
that all interest groups are self-interested.116 Still, the theory that special interests “push 
government officials away from making decisions in the public interest” is “[a]n important 
scholarly and popular tradition.”117 We know that individuals with social or economic power have 
an easier time representing their interests in government.118 In other words, our political 
“adversary system” might unconsciously be putting a thumb on the scale in favor of special 
interests. 
In fact, there is evidence which points to a deep division in representation by lower-class 
Americans in interest groups.119 There is a long line of scholarly thinking that the wealthy are able 
to easily use the political process to maintain their wealth.120 If this view is true, it presents an 
obvious problem for our government: how do we maintain the Federalist vision of government, 
which is influenced by the popular will? 
The only hope lies in the ability of non-wealthy Americans to use their collective 
strength to defend their government from such negative influences. Given the difficulty attendant 
to political organization, the American people are left with a singular realistic option: rely on 
large, representative political organizations. 
B. Labor Unions Are a Means for Representation of the Working Class in America,  
and Right-to-Work Laws Reduce Their Effectiveness 
1. Labor Unions Provide a Means of Representation 
Among other things, labor unions exist to give a voice to American workers.121 While 
this mission is broad and includes a wide variety of activities (including collective bargaining, 
training, and much more), the focus of this section is on a union’s ability to collectively represent 
individuals. Since it is organizationally difficult for the working class to speak with one voice, it 
is crucial that they be able to work together to delegate their political representation to 
                                                                  
115  MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND 
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).  
116  Consider, for example, environmental groups, which stand to gain very little personally from any policy 
victory. 
117  BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 87, at 86. 
118  Id. at 89. 
119  Id. at 92 (stating those with higher social status are much more involved than others). 
120  See, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA (Cengage Learning, 1975) (1960); C.M.A. Mc Cauliff, Didn’t Your Mother Teach You to Share?: Wealth, 
Lobbying, and Distributive Justice in the Wake of the Economic Crisis, 62 R U T G E R S  L .  R E V .  383, 425 (2010) (“Those 
without money, however, do not get the opportunity to present information about their lives to legislators nor do they get 
the chance to explain the impact that proposed legislation will have on their lives.”). 
121  What Unions Do, A F L - C I O , http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/What-Unions-Do (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2015). 
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organizational interests.122 Most importantly, the broad base, which forms the membership of 
labor unions, creates a coherent voice for working Americans. Labor unions allow the working 
class to counteract the disproportionate influence of the wealthy.123 Thus, labor unions have the 
ability to promote the Federalist goal of political participation and representation of all classes. 
Unions have a unique ability to perform this task because they have the ability to provide 
broad-based representation for their members, with little active responsibility required of 
individual members. While many interest groups work on a specific issue or two, labor unions 
represent vast and diverse swaths of the American population. For example, the AFL-CIO 
represents unions as diverse as the Air Line Pilots Association, the American Radio Association, 
the Guild of Italian American Actors, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, the International 
Union of Police Associations, National Nurses United, and the Office and Professional 
Employees International Union.124 The individuals included in these groups likely have little in 
common except the economic issues they jointly face as members of the working class. In all, this 
group of AFL-CIO members includes more than twelve million Americans.125 Nationally, there 
are some 14.6 million workers who belong to unions, 11.1% of the population of wage and salary 
workers.126 This diversity allows a national union like the AFL-CIO to focus on the common 
interests of workers. It also allows for massive economies of scale—the larger the union, the less 
individual work is needed to accomplish the group’s goals. 
Because their members are middle- and lower-class,127 labor unions represent the type of 
citizen who is unlikely to have her voice heard in government.128 In other words, labor unions fill 
an important gap in America’s republican form of government. They represent individuals who 
would otherwise have a very difficult time representing themselves in government.129 Because 
these individuals are the least likely to engage with political organizations,130 it is important that 
the group takes advantage of the economy of scale and asks relatively little of its individual 
members. 
Americans, as a whole, are very involved with political associations. In 1995, seventy-
nine percent of Americans were involved with a voluntary organization.131 Sixty-one percent of 
those were involved in an organization that takes a stand in politics, amounting to forty-eight 
                                                                  
122  See supra Part II.A. 
123  See What Unions Do, supra note 121. 
124  AFL-CIO Unions, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/About/AFL-CIO-Unions (last visited Apr. 30, 
2015). 
125  Id. 
126  Union Members—2014, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
127  The median weekly earning for a union member is $970, compared with $763 for a non-union employee. 
Id. 
128  See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 87, at 86, 89, 92 (discussing the tendency of interest groups to 
primarily benefit the wealthy). 
129  See infra Part II.B.3 (regarding unions’ abilities to increase political participation). 
130  See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 87, at 86, 89, 92. 
131  SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, V O I C E  A N D  E Q U A L I T Y :  C I V I C  
V O L U N T A R I S M  I N  A M E R I C A N  P O L I T I C S  62 (1995).  
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percent of Americans.132 However, more than half of those involved in voluntary organizations do 
not get involved beyond a monetary donation;133 in social services groups, nearly eighty percent 
of involvement is limited to a monetary contribution.134 American political participation is largely 
limited to those with discretionary income, as I discuss below. 
Involvement in political organizations depends in large part on the ability of that 
organization to recruit—that is, to ask others to join. The high political participation rate of the 
rich stems largely from the fact that they are asked to participate. Although high-income earners 
are asked more often to participate in activities, they are not necessarily more likely to do so if 
asked.135 In other words, low-income individuals are just as likely to join an organization if 
presented with the opportunity. This is why it is so crucial for organizations to have the ability to 
actively recruit new members: it may make the critical difference in an individual’s decision to sit 
on the sidelines or get involved.136 
This difference matters a great deal, especially when one considers the fact that about 
half of respondents in one study could not recall being asked to participate in a political 
organization at all within the past year.137 This means that many individuals are unlikely to ever 
be solicited (let alone agree) to participate in politics. These individuals are more likely to be low-
income Americans—exactly the ones who need representation the most, because they lack the 
capacity to participate in other ways (most notably with time and money). They are also the 
individuals who could potentially be represented by a labor union since they are likely to have 
jobs which could be unionized. 
In fact, scholars have noted that labor unions fill a niche that is unique to American 
politics—the absence of a labor-focused political party.138 In many other nations, a labor party 
exists primarily to promote the views of the working class.139 This fits in with the Federalist 
vision of elected officials who represent specific trades or classes of people.140 
But labor parties do more than simply vote in a legislature. They “play a significant role 
in the political mobilization of those who, on the basis of their income and education, might 
otherwise not take part politically.”141 The American two-party system, however, has not allowed 
space for a large, labor-oriented movement.142 But workers have not allowed this to stop them 
                                                                  
132  Id.  
133  Id. at 63, tbl.3.5. 
134  Id. at 64. 
135  Id. at 150. 
136  But see id. at 158 (explaining that causality is not one-way—those who are asked are most likely to be 
active, and those who are active are most likely to be asked). 
137  Id. at 156. 
138  Id. at 384-85. 
139  See, e.g., Labor is for Workers, A U S T R A L I A N  L A B O R  P A R T Y , http://www.alp.org.au/workers (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2015); History of the Labour Party, L A B O U R ,  http://www.labour.org.uk/pages/history-of-the-labour-
party (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (British Labour Party); Labour’s Proud History, L A B O U R ,  
http://www.labour.ie/party/history (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (Irish Labour Party). 
140  See T H E  F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  42, supra note 60, at 264; OSTROM, supra note 2, at 163-64. 
141  VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 131, at 384. 
142  Id. at 384-85; id. at 385 (noting that “there are no working-class or peasant parties” in American 
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from being mobilized to ensure their representation—they have formed strong labor unions to 
attempt to fill this gap. 
But it has not exactly worked. American labor unions represent a “relatively small 
proportion of the work force.”143 However, they offer an important resource: the development of 
“civic skills,” which increase the likelihood of political engagement.144 These skills—as general 
as education and language, and as specific as exposure to political issues—enable individuals with 
the basic competency necessary to participate in their government. 
And while these unions do in fact offer opportunities for increased political mobilization 
and education,145 American labor unions do not totally fill the representation gap. American 
workers still do not have an effective and permanent way to engage with the political process.146 
Only a minority of Americans are members of a labor union.147 But if we believe that we should 
preserve organizations which do some part to promote political participation, we should take the 
role of labor unions very seriously. 
The idea of labor unions as political representatives is in harmony with the Federalist 
view that the different classes of society would choose to be represented in government by those 
who promote their interests.148 While the founders could not have foreseen the enormity of the 
industrial revolution and the resulting dominance of labor unions, they did recognize that different 
occupations had different concerns.149 They believed that artisans would choose those who best 
represented their interests: merchants.150 Today, however, workers are able to organize and vote 
for one of their own to represent them. Labor unions make possible what the founders thought 
impossible: the self-representation of individuals of lower classes in Congress. Labor unions 
allow workers to pool their resources together to jointly pay for one of their own to go to 
Washington to represent them (either officially as a member of Congress, or unofficially through 
lobbying).151 
Labor unions were able to carry out this representation at maximum efficiency when they 
gained the ability to form a “closed shop,” which requires all workers at one business to be 
members of the appropriate labor union.152 The benefits of this arrangement to the vitality of the 
labor movement are obvious, and it results in the ability of labor to quickly amass political power 
                                                                  
politics). 
143  VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 131, at 385 (finding that American churches function to fill 
the gap in nurturing politically relevant skills); see also Union Members—2014, note 126 (finding only 11.1% of the 
population of wage and salary workers belong to unions). 
144  VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 131, at 304. 
145  See id. at 386 (finding that labor unions offer a greater chance for political participation than American 
churches). 
146  See id. at 384-85. 
147  See Union Members—2014, supra note 126. 
148  See supra Part I. 
149  See OSTROM, supra note 2, at 163. 
150  See THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  35, supra note 45, at 211-12. 
151  HERRING, supra note 93, at 138. 
152  James C. Thomas, Right-to-Work: Settled Law or Unfinished Journey, 8 L O Y .  J .  P U B .  I N T .  L .  163, 
172 (2007). 
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to be used for the benefit of its members. It also allows labor unions to create the infrastructure to 
encourage individual participation by their members.153 As a result, even when individual workers 
do not agree with the union’s stance, they still benefit from the opportunities created by unions to 
learn political skills.154 
By providing a sort of automatic representation for the working classes, they provide a 
counterbalance to wealthy special interests. Business interests can very easily and quickly 
organize due to their greater resources and smaller numbers.155 The efficiency in recruitment and 
membership created by labor unions is critical because opposing wealthy interests have numerous 
advantages in organizing themselves politically. If labor unions are to be a counterbalance to the 
wealthy, they must be feasible to organize. 
Historically, robust labor unions have been able to provide tangible economic benefits in 
addition to political organization. According to a study by the Congressional Research Service, 
“the wages of union workers are in the range of 10% to 30% higher than the wages of nonunion 
workers.”156 This amount includes wages and fringe benefits—union workers usually receive 
better fringe benefits than nonunion workers.157 
But, as with any other special interest which wields a large amount of power, bad actors 
were able to abuse the system of labor unions. As a result, the approval rating of labor unions has 
dropped from a high of 75% in the 1950s to 52% in 2011.158 
Of course, whether labor unions have ultimately been good for the economy is the 
subject of vigorous debate.159 Perhaps it is true that labor unions do not ultimately work best to 
protect the economic interests of their members. But I do not seek to address the larger question 
of the merits of union representation in this Article. 
But the point remains today: in a society in which the wealth of the top one percent of 
wage earners is increasing quickly, labor unions provide a means for mass representation of low- 
and middle-income workers. They provide an avenue for individuals whose voices would 
otherwise be lost. They provide an infrastructure which channels those voices into organizational 
leaders. Because of these features, membership in labor unions might be the only way for the 
majority of Americans to effectively counteract the disproportionate influence of the richest 
Americans. 
2. The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws 
The ability of unions to organize has been undercut by recent movement toward so-
                                                                  
153  See infra Part II.B.3. 
154  See infra Part II.B.3. 
155  BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 87, at 94-95, 106, 107. 
156  GERALD MAYER, C O N G .  R E S E A R C H  S E R V ., U N I O N  M E M B E R S H I P  T R E N D S  I N  T H E  
U N I T E D  S T A T E S  6 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1176&context=key_workplace. 
157  Id. at 7. 
158  Jeffrey M. Jones, Approval of Labor Unions Holds Near Its Low, at 52%, GALLUP (Aug. 31, 2011) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149279/approval-labor-unions-holds-near-low.aspx. 
159  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Last Gasp of Union Power, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/last-gasp-union-power. 
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called “right-to-work” laws. These laws “criminalize compulsory union membership and grant to 
workers individual freedom to join or refrain from joining labor unions.”160 In right-to-work 
states, workers are free to choose whether they will pay union dues or not, but “unions remain 
obligated to provide full services and benefits of union representation to all workers whether they 
pay dues or not.”161 
The first right-to-work law was passed as a constitutional amendment in Florida in 
1944.162 The right-to-work movement began in earnest in the South, where textile manufacturers 
saw the need to fend off potential unionization of their workers.163 Right-to-work laws were 
pursued on the state level due to a perception that the national labor policy would continue to 
favor unions.164 Between 1944 and 1946, Arkansas, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Arizona enacted 
right-to-work laws.165 In 1958, voters rejected similar measures in California, Ohio, Colorado, 
Idaho, and Washington—a right-to-work law was approved only in the agricultural state of 
Kansas that year.166 Over time, right-to-work laws were eventually passed in twenty-five states.167 
During this time period, the federal government also enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, which 
guaranteed employees the right not to join unions.168 As a result, union shops are only allowed 
where state law permits, and only when a majority of workers vote for them.169 The Act also 
required advance notification if a union planned to strike, restricted union political contributions, 
and required union officers to deny any Communist affiliations.170 
Proponents of right-to-work laws claim that these laws benefit society because they 
allow for optimal free-market transactions.171 If one sees union representation as a means for 
achieving only a contract, there is no reason why employment at a company should be dependent 
upon being a member of that union.172 In other words, the union can bargain for a contract, but it 
cannot exclude nonmembers from employment (as in a closed shop). The argument is based on 
the free-market right to contract for one’s own employment, to “improve fairness for workers who 
                                                                  
160  Thomas, supra note 152, at 163. 
161  Id. 
162  J.R. DEMPSEY, T H E  O P E R A T I O N  O F  R I G H T - T O - W O R K  L A W S  1-2 (Marquette University Press 
1961). 
163  GILBERT J. GALL, T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  R I G H T - T O - W O R K :  T H E  L A B O R  F E D E R A T I O N S  A S  
S P E C I A L  I N T E R E S T S ,  1 9 4 3 - 1 9 7 9 ,  a t  18 (Greenwood Press 1988). 
164  Id. at 19. 
165  Id. at 19. 
166  DEMPSEY, supra note 162, at 1. 
167  See Right-to-Work States, N A T ’ L  R I G H T  T O  W O R K  L E G A L  D E F .  F O U N D . , 
http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
168  ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 494 (15th ed. 2002). 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Richard Vedder, Matthew Denhart & Jonathan Robe, Right-to-Work and Indiana’s Economic Future, 
IND. CHAMBER 1-3 (Jan. 2011), http://www.indianachamber.com/images/media/studies/IndianaRightToWork-1-27-11.pdf. 
172  See DEMPSEY, supra note 162, at 3. 
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may or may not want to pay to join a union.”173 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder argues that individuals will still want to join labor 
unions if they offer services that are good enough.174 This argument misses the obvious 
counterargument that such a system creates a major incentive for free-riding.175 Why would 
someone join a labor union if they could get all of its benefits without paying for any of the cost? 
Why buy the cow if you can get the milk for free? 
The unions themselves, however, see the necessity of a closed shop as an essential means 
of survival.176 A closed shop dramatically changes the organizational hurdles faced by labor 
organizers. In fact, some scholars identify the primary “problem of the American labor 
movement” as the difficulty in getting and staying organized.177 
Naturally, the state of affairs under right-to-work laws makes it very difficult for labor 
unions to remain a viable option. Union members are forced to expend resources to actively 
engage their fellow workers to convince them to join and pay for representation in a union.178 
Many of them simply do not want to pay. As a result, unionization has declined between 10% and 
30% in right-to-work states.179 
In the United States, the number of unionized workers has decreased from a high of 
28.3% of workers in 1954, to 11.5% in 2003.180 It is difficult to pinpoint the cause of this 
decrease. However, of the twenty-five states which enacted right-to-work laws, sixteen were 
enacted between 1944 and 1955.181 This fact, combined with research showing that right-to-work 
laws directly decrease union membership,182 is strong evidence that right-to-work laws are a 
significant cause of reduced unionization in America. 
                                                                  
173  Matthew Dolan & Kris Maher, Push to Curb Union Power Advances in Michigan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 
2012, at A4. 
174  See id. 
175  Raymond Hogler & Steven Shulman, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Right to Work: Colorado’s 
Labor Peace Act and Its Implications for Public Policy, 70 U .  C O L O .  L .  R E V .  871, 930 (1999). 
176  See “Right to Work” Laws: Get the Facts, MINNESOTA AFL-CIO, http://www.mnaflcio.org/news/right-
work-laws-get-facts (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (arguing that allowing nonunion workers to take advantage of union 
services weakens “the best job security protections workers have”); James R. Eissinger, The Right-to-Work Imbroglio, 51 
N.D. L. Rev. 571, 572 n.6 (1975) (noting that labor unions opposed a right-to-work provision); DEMPSEY, supra note 162, 
at 3. 
177  DEMPSEY, supra note 162, at 4 (citing Selig Perlman, Labor and the New Deal in Historical Perspective, 
in L A B O R  A N D  T H E  N E W  D E A L  3 6 1 , 363 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young, eds., 1957)). 
178  In Right-to-Work States, Members Do the Hard Work of Organizing, C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  
W O R K E R S  O F  A M E R I C A  (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/in_Right-to-
Work_states_members_do_the_hard_work_of_organizing#. 
179  Hogler & Shulman, supra note 175, at 930. 
180  MAYER, supra note 156.  
181  Right-to-Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
182  Hogler & Shulman, supra note 175, at 930. 
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3. Labor Unions Work to Achieve Political Representation for Their Members 
Labor unions have the ability to organize a large number of individuals, acting as a sort 
of “special interest” to counter other organized special interests.183 They are under attack by 
Republican politicians who support right-to-work laws “to promote worker freedom and to 
promote greater economic liberty.”184 On the other hand, Democratic politicians continue their 
alliance with labor unions to promote collective bargaining as a “path to the middle class.”185 It is 
unsurprising that right-to-work laws have been promoted by Republicans. Democrats support 
labor unions at a rate of 78%, while Republican support was 26% in 2011.186 
The recent attacks on labor unions have mostly occurred in the Midwestern states of 
Ohio,187 Indiana,188 Michigan,189 and most recently, Wisconsin.190 Republican politicians have 
proposed them all. This makes sense given the opinion poll just mentioned, but it also underscores 
the theoretical basis for this Article. Labor unions give 92% of their funding to Democrats.191 
Why do they do this? Labor union members are much more likely to be Democrats than 
Republicans.192 In other words, labor unions are being used by individuals to pool their resources 
and donate money to help elect the politicians they agree with.193 Even if a union member does 
not individually agree with every view of a candidate, the infrastructure of union membership 
encourages more participation, prompting all union members to participate, even if they vote 
                                                                  
183  See Part II.B.1; see generally GALL, supra note 163 (describing the rise of unions in politics as the 
development of a special interest). 
184  We Believe in America: 2012 Republican Platform, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE 8 (2012), 
http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf. 
185  MOVING AMERICA FORWARD: 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM, http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-
platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf; see GALL, supra note 163, at 8 (discussing the “labor-Democratic alliance”). 
186  Jones, supra note 158. 
187  See Robert Alt, Ohio Needs a Second Dose of Labor Reform, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2015) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ohio-needs-a-second-dose-of-labor-reform-1429913774.  
188  See Mark Guarino, Indiana ‘Right to Work’ Law: What it Means for the Pro-Union Rust Belt, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0207/Indiana-right-to-work-law-
what-it-means-for-the-pro-union-Rust-Belt. 
189  Monica Davey, Limits on Unions Pass in Michigan, Once a Mainstay, N . Y .  T I M E S ,  Dec. 12, 2012, at 
A1. 
190  See Douglas Belkin, Colleen McCain Nelson & Caroline Porter, Recall Bid Fails in Wisconsin: Gov. 
Scott Walker’s Win Caps Fiery Battle, Deals Public-Sector Unions a Blow, W A L L  S T .  J .  (June 6, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303918204577448313090640398. 
191  Tom McGinty & Brody Mullins, Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct Donations, W A L L  
S T .  J . ,  July 10, 2012, at A1. 
192  Frank Newport, Dan Witters & Sangeeta Agrawal, Democrats Lead Ranks of Both Union and State 
Workers, G A L L U P  (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146786/democrats-lead-ranks-union-state-workers.aspx. 
193  Aaron J. Sojourner, Do Unions Promote Members’ Electoral Office Holding? Evidence from Correlates 
of State Legislatures’ Occupational Shares, ILR REV. J. WORK & POL’Y 467, (2013) (finding that unionization results in 
elected political leadership by individuals from working- and middle-class jobs). This has long been one of the goals of 
labor unions. See HERRING, supra note 93, at 138. 
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against the union’s preferences.194 They are working together to promote the representation of 
their views in government. 
There is an obvious counterargument to this line of thought: about a quarter of union 
members are Republicans.195 Those Republicans should not be forced to donate to candidates 
whom they do not support. But there are two important flaws in that argument. First, it falsely 
assumes that registered Republicans never support Democrats. Second, it assumes that there is no 
way for union members to opt out of political spending, but the Supreme Court has required such 
an opt-out in its union security cases.196 
With this caveat, it is easy to see how labor unions form an organization that allows a 
group of workers to elect representatives who agree with their views. Looking at labor unions 
only from this view, they are an example of one way to give low-income Americans the boost 
they need to counteract the organizational advantage of the wealthy. But labor unions have had to 
fight tooth and nail for the rights they have today. 
In fact, it was the battle over the very same right-to-work proposals that prodded labor 
unions to begin their increased active participation in state politics.197 Labor unions were forced to 
fight for their participation in American government, and they met the challenge by resorting to 
both electoral and lobbying activity. Today, they provide an opportunity for political involvement 
and engagement that might not be available to a large segment of American citizens.198 
This organization and engagement provides something the Federalists would have 
wanted: a means for political engagement at a time when it is extremely difficult for Americans to 
be involved directly with government, due to the increasing size and diversity of the population. 
The Federalists recognized the importance of organization in order to resist the encroachments of 
overzealous government.199 Today, unions provide that degree of organization for about eleven 
percent of Americans.200 This allows labor unions, as a group, to interact directly with the 
government,201 in furtherance of the Federalist vision of inclusion of interests. 
If individual union members were asked to provide direct input on something as complex 
as the federal budget (or even any of the fifty states’ budgets), they, like most people, would 
                                                                  
194  Roland Zullo, Union Membership and Political Inclusion, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 22 (2008) 
(finding that unionization increases voter turnout, even though those voters did not always vote with pro-labor candidates). 
195  See Newport, Witters, & Agrawal, supra note 192. 
196  See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Benjamin 
I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 C O L U M .  L .  R E V .  800 (2012) 
(describing the history of the opt-out right and arguing that a similar right should exist for corporate shareholders). It is not 
immediately apparent, however, that each employee should only have the choice of one labor union. If an alternate labor 
union would better promote an individual’s interests, perhaps she should be able to join that other one. 
197  GALL, supra note 163, at 9. 
198  Zullo, supra note 194, at 22 (finding that unionization increases voter turnout for union members, even 
though those voters did not always vote with pro-labor candidates). 
199  See supra Part I.B. 
200  See Union Members—2014, supra note 126. 
201  See Jasmine Kerrissey & Evan Schofer, Union Membership and Political Participation in the United 
States, 91 SOCIAL FORCES 895, 899 (2013) (indicating that labor unions’ encouragement of participation by their members 
results in increased active participation in politics). 
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probably be at a loss. In truth, very few people understand such complex legislation.202 Labor 
unions allow individual members to have a delegated representative who can provide input on 
these complex issues through lobbying, or by providing the infrastructure for union members to 
engage in direct action such as protests. 
4. Labor Unions Provide a Voice to Those Who Would Otherwise Not Participate in Government 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this beneficial effect is that most individuals in 
labor unions would otherwise have no voice at all because it is difficult for an individual voice to 
be heard in today’s government. The union members would have an extraordinarily difficult time 
counteracting the well-organized business interests.203 If not for unions, many wageworkers 
would not participate at all in elections. If not for unions, they would have one fewer civic 
institution providing the needed skills to participate in democracy. 
The Federalists emphasized the need for skilled, reasoned political debate.204 They did 
not want mobs with pitchforks deciding national policy. The Federalists recognized that 
government is simply too complex and too nuanced to be run by uneducated or unsophisticated 
individuals.205 The Federalists were writing before the true dawn of the Industrial Revolution, so 
they did not see society organized into the same structure we see today. If they did, they would 
recognize that their desire for reason and a government made of the best men would result in large 
segments of society (low-income and industrial workers especially) being virtually unrepresented. 
This stands in direct contrast with their desire for different interests to be represented.206 
Labor unions can solve this problem. The ability to delegate political representation 
means that even the least economically empowered among us can find a way to obtain direct 
representation in government. But that representation depends on the ability of the union to recruit 
members. Right-to-work laws force Unions to provide services even to non-members—essentially 
allowing free riders to get something for nothing.207 This is unsustainable in the long run. It will 
continue to weaken the power of unions, and therefore weaken individuals’ ability to have their 
voices heard in government. 
5. Counterarguments: Are Labor Unions Really the Answer to the Federalist Vision? 
There is no doubt that the Federalists were concerned about the harmful ability of 
factions to usurp the national governing process to serve their own interests.208 In fact, this is 
perhaps the part of the Federalist Papers which is most often remembered by politicians, 
                                                                  
202  See Somin, supra note 96, at 1294. 
203  See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 87, at 107. 
204  See supra Part I.A.  
205  See supra Part I.C. 
206  This might seem contradictory today in light of the fact that they also granted the vote only to white, 
male property owners. However, they believed that such limited suffrage would in fact represent all interests—they just 
had a different idea about interests. 
207  See supra Part II.B.3. 
208  See, e.g., THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  9, supra note 7; THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O . 10, supra note 9; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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attorneys, and judges who shape our laws today. Federalist No. 10 is the most famous explanation 
of this theoretical conundrum: how do you allow a popular government to exist without enabling 
unstable factions to form and control that very government? 
Proponents of a right-to-work law could plausibly argue that unions are the prototypical 
form of faction: they organize a large mass of people around a single theme, and they have a 
substantial impact on the outcome of elections. Are labor unions not “united and actuated by some 
common impulse of . . . interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens,” as Madison warned?209 
Labor unions have been formed specifically for the purpose of uniting the class of workers against 
the class of management. If completely successful, might they represent a majority faction which 
imposes its will on the rest of the nation? 
Furthermore, proponents of a right-to work law would argue that labor unions do not rely 
on the use of reason—they are notorious for riling up the passions of their members for political 
purposes.210 In fact, the “laboratory conditions” doctrine prohibits tactics that are not aimed at 
“reasoning faculties,” indicating an assumption in labor law doctrine that unions often rely on 
emotional appeals.211 Unions are often required to wait during “cooling-off periods” before voting 
to unionize.212 They have participated in events like Occupy Wall Street,213 which specifically 
draw attention to an emotional aspect of their arguments: that the rich are taking advantage of the 
rest. Unions are taking advantage of emotions, rather than relying on the force of reason. The 
Federalists warned us against exactly this: allowing passion to creep in and poison the political 
process.214 Labor unions, right-to-work advocates would say, are pushing us away from the 
Federalist vision of reasoned, open discussion in national government. 
But these arguments would misrepresent the context in which Madison discusses faction 
in Federalist No. 10.215 Madison explained why the national government deals with factions better 
than any previous government. Faction is inevitable.216 He explained that the federal 
government’s structure would prevent faction by drawing in all of the interests of society.217 
Madison said that if the national government properly represents a wide range of views, no single 
majority will be able to prevail.218 He said that the Constitution would accomplish this by 
                                                                  
209  THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 72. 
210  Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 313, 348 (2012) (“[T]o 
overcome workers’ skepticism toward or fears of organizing, . . . . leaders utilize emotionally- and politically-charged 
appeals . . . .”). 
211  Id. at 315. 
212  Id. at 334. 
213  Steven Greenhouse & Cara Buckley, Seeking Energy, Unions Join Protest Against Wall Street, N . Y .  
T I M E S  (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/nyregion/major-unions-join-occupy-wall-street-
protest.html. 
214  See supra Part I.C. 
215  It should also be noted that these references to passion relate to the act of unionizing or negotiating with 
management, not to political representation after formation of the union. 
216  THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 73-75. 
217  Id. at 74-78. 
218  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 T H E  D E B A T E  O N  T H E  
C O N S T I T U T I O N ,  192, 201 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1993). 
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expanding the pool of citizens from which to choose representatives.219 This enlarged pool would 
permit only the most public-spirited individuals to achieve a position of influence in the 
government. 
Labor unions make an important contribution to expanding the pool of citizens from 
which to choose representatives. They solve the collective action problem faced by millions of 
workers who could not individually obtain representation. By pooling their resources to provide 
for a group representative, labor unions can have some influence on policy, or may even actually 
run one of their own members for political office. 
A thought experiment is helpful for understanding the importance of organized 
representation for low-income individuals. Imagine for a moment what a world without any 
organized labor would look like. It is a world in which many wage earners wake up, go to work 
early, come home late, and go to sleep. Some would probably be able to negotiate more favorable 
contracts with employers, but the most vulnerable—those with the least bargaining power—
would be given the worst deal. Yet many would still choose to keep their employment for fear 
that they have no other options, or because the other options are equally bad. 
In such a world, how would James Madison’s project of reducing factionalism work? 
The large number of congressional representatives would still be drawn from the far-flung reaches 
of the nation to represent the patchwork of interests inherent in America’s immensity. But, in such 
a world, can we realistically expect wage earners to be among those representatives? 
Of course, Madison’s view must be altered somewhat to account for the fact that we no 
longer believe that only certain classes of individuals are qualified to participate in that choice. 
The trend in the United States since its founding has been toward more participation, and more 
inclusion in the electoral process (albeit with some significant setbacks). We have granted the 
right to vote to non-property-owners,220 and then African-Americans males,221 then women,222 
then young people.223 In light of this history, it only makes sense to reinterpret Madison’s vision 
of broad inclusion as a mandate to represent the interests of these groups as well. 
One might speculate that the Federalists would not have supported a requirement that a 
worker pay dues to a third party in order to engage in a contract with his employer. Such a 
counterargument fails to acknowledge, however, that large corporations did not exist at the time 
of our nation’s founding. If they had, the Federalists might have been forced to confront the 
question of whether labor laws fit their vision of government. But if we look solely to the issue of 
political representation, the Federalists’ views are quite clear: they wanted inclusion of different 
voices.224 So the question for the Federalist vision is whether labor laws promote or discourage 
participatory democracy. 
                                                                  
219  THE F E D E R A L I S T  N O .  10, supra note 9, at 77. 
220  KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 78-111 (Univ. Chi. Press 
1918) (describing how states removed voting requirements of property ownership). 
221  U . S .  C O N S T . amend. XV. 
222  U . S .  C O N S T . amend. XIX. 
223  U . S .  C O N S T . amend. XXVI. However, we still deny electoral participation to significant groups—
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Low-income individuals face a significant disadvantage when it comes to participating in 
the political process. They lack the two most important resources needed to participate directly in 
the political process: time and money.225 A study conducted by Professors Sidney Verba, Kay 
Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady found that while the average citizen participates in 2.1 
political acts per year,226 low-income individuals participated remarkably less.227 These “political 
acts” include the simple act of voting.228 Those who made between $15,000 and $34,999 
participated in 1.9 acts per year.229 Those who made less than $15,000 participated in 1.3 acts per 
year.230 This disparity is especially poignant when compared to individuals who make above 
$125,000 per year, who participate 3.4 times per year, on average.231 
The act of voting was the only activity in which high-income earners did not double the 
participation rates of low-income individuals.232 But 86% of those with high income voted, still 
outpacing low-income voting, at 52%.233 This disparity is shocking given that voting is probably 
the least demanding form of political participation. Of course, we cannot know what causes this 
gap. It could be due to lack of resources, but it could also be due simply to the fact that there is a 
dearth of organization—that low-income Americans are simply less likely to be asked to 
participate.234 But it is not surprising if one considers the union-free world I described above. If an 
individual is left without even the time needed to cast a ballot, we certainly would not expect her 
to donate further time volunteering for a campaign. 
This is a major problem for Madison’s vision. In order to achieve a broad representation 
of interests, those with diverse interests must be able to at least participate in the most basic level 
of political activity. To understand this point, it is useful to consider a hypothetical. Imagine that 
no low-income individuals were able to vote. In such a society, no portion of Congress would 
have a stake in representing the interests of poor people. This is the worst-case scenario for 
Madison’s Federalist No. 10. This is factionalism at its worst—a segment of society (the middle 
and upper classes) has effectively banded together and is able to ignore another class of society 
(the poor). 
The representation of low-income individuals is not a promotion of factionalism or a 
repudiation of Madison’s plan in Federalist No. 10. Rather, Madison’s vision requires that some 
members of Congress represent the needs of low-income Americans. To exclude any portion of 
Americans would enable the very factional control he warned against. We can only adhere to 
Madison’s vision by ensuring representation of all interests, so that no single group can take 
control over the government. Large representative groups like labor unions advance this goal, and 
the more easily they can recruit, the easier they can represent their members. 
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So whose views actually do get represented in our government? Professors Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady found that “[t]hose whose preferences and needs become visible to 
policymakers through their activity are unrepresentative of those who are more quiescent in ways 
that are of great political significance.”235 The government simply does not get as much 
information from those who face problems of “basic human needs.”236 
Of course, one could argue that this has nothing to do with unions because union 
members are statistically better off than those who face these more drastic needs. But this 
argument misses the point. Labor unions are some of the only large organizations that focus on 
the needs of people at the lower end of the income spectrum. While they may not actually 
represent the absolute neediest, they come closer than many other organizations. And given the 
inherent advantages that business interests have, we should not let the imperfections of labor 
unions hinder the good they do. Further, unions are constantly seeking to expand and include new 
members so that they can pull more workers out of poverty. The goal of the labor movement is to 
help the poorest workers achieve their fair share of representation. Of course their members will 
be better off than the neediest—that means that they are successful in their mission. 
An objection that labor unions do not represent the neediest is invalid because labor 
unions bring low-income Americans into the political process. Even though unions may not 
perfectly represent their members in every way, they have the ability and scale to bring large 
groups of people into the political process. So even if one believes that labor representatives are 
no better at representing the working class than political representatives, labor unions still serve a 
public good: inclusion of people in the political process. An important finding in the Verba, 
Scholzman, and Brady study is that “[o]nce active, . . . the poor are as generous with their time as 
those who are better off financially.”237 According to Professors Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 
the poor’s “lack of financial resources does not appear to act as an impediment to the investment 
of ‘sweat equity.’”238 This suggests that low-income workers do not a lack interest or ability to 
participate. They simply need to be “activated,” that is, they need a spark to ignite their flame of 
political participation. 
This is something which unions can provide. Labor unions solve a collective action 
problem faced by workers. Since no individual has the time or resources to individually obtain 
representation in government, a collective group is necessary. This group can create a framework 
for carrying out that collective bargaining, but also a framework for political activism and 
effective representation in government. In other words, such a group is necessary to accomplish 
Madison’s view by ensuring the representation of the group’s members in government. Without a 
group to represent low-income Americans, the faction of upper-income Americans will take hold 
and be able to oppress. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Federalist vision for American government has three prerequisites: the use of reason, 
the representation of all interests, and influence of the popular will. The Constitution was 
groundbreaking in its ability to blend these three contradictory interests. There is constant tension 
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between giving power to the people, and aiming for reasoned discussion by knowledgeable 
individuals. 
Today, each government official represents more individuals than ever before. Yet we 
still rely on the same Constitution to ascertain the popular will. The Federalists could not have 
foreseen the upheaval caused by the Industrial Revolution, or the changes of the twentieth 
century. But we have come up with a way of accomplishing those three Federalist goals without 
changing our Constitution’s structure: using large organizations to represent the needs of 
Americans in our government. 
In this Article, I take labor unions as one example of a large representative organization. 
Labor unions, and other similar organizations, provide the structural support necessary to organize 
lower- and middle-class Americans. This organizational benefit is critical to counteract the 
relative ease with which high-income and business interests are able to organize. Labor unions 
provide the simple ability to ask individuals to participate in their government. Whether that 
question is asked is often dispositive of whether a person will indeed have the ability to have her 
voice heard. But right-to-work laws work against this ability, because they undermine the 
structural benefit of unions, which is to solve a collective action problem. 
Representative organizations achieve the Federalist vision by allowing massive numbers 
of individuals to delegate their representation to a small number of people who can become 
experts and participate in a reasoned discussion at the table of government. Given that the size of 
government has not increased at the same pace as the size of the nation, this is the only way for 
many individuals to ever have their voices heard. 
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